Security Advisory 2026-11-16

Multiple vulnerabilities in phpMyFAQ

Issued on:
2026-11-16
Software:
phpMyFAQ <= 4.1.11 and 4.2.0-RC.1
Risk:
High
Platforms:
all

The phpMyFAQ Team has learned of security issues that'd been discovered in phpMyFAQ 4.1.11 and earlier, and in the phpMyFAQ 4.2.0 pre-releases up to 4.2.0-RC.1.

Description

High severity

  • The web installer ignores a legacy config/database.php, so it is reachable without authentication during the documented 3.1/3.2 to 4.x upgrade.
  • In multisite setups the Redis configuration store is not tenant-scoped, so a tenant administrator can read and overwrite the master instance's effective configuration, including the SMTP relay, the API token, and the authentication settings.
  • In multisite setups the shared PHP session store lets a WebAuthn prepare() on one tenant be completed by /api/webauthn/register on another tenant, overwriting the passkeys of the same login, for example the master administrator.
  • A WebAuthn assertion can be replayed after a fresh challenge has been issued, allowing authentication bypass in phpMyFAQ 4.1.7 to 4.1.11.
  • The layout.customCss configuration field is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting that executes on every public page.
  • In the 4.2.0 pre-releases the password reset token is signed with the stored password hash instead of a server secret, allowing account takeover.

Moderate severity

  • Stored attribute-injection cross-site scripting on the public start page via the top-ten FAQ titles.
  • Incomplete fix of GHSA-j4rc-96xj-gvqc: the public FAQ REST API still returns author e-mail addresses to unauthenticated clients and ignores the GDPR author-visibility opt-out.
  • Unauthenticated GET /api/v4.0/faqs returns the editor-only "Private Notes" field of every FAQ the anonymous ACL can read.
  • The password reset sets a local password on OIDC, Keycloak, Entra ID, LDAP, SSO, and WebAuthn accounts. The "non-local account" guard in getEncryptedPassword() can never fire, so the identity provider is bypassed.
  • Remember-me cookies survive a password change via self-service, admin, and forgot-password reset (CWE-613).
  • WebAuthn passkey sign-up via POST /api/webauthn/prepare creates accounts as active, bypassing spam.manualActivation and the registration domain whitelist. The fix for CVE-2026-27836 was lost on 4.1 and main.
  • The FAQ CSV import via POST /admin/api/faq/import bypasses the 4.2 FAQ_PUBLISH right, so a contributor with FAQ_ADD only can publish FAQs directly and skip editorial review.
  • The SVG sanitizer misses namespace-prefixed elements such as <x:script>, so a user with FAQ_EDIT can store SVG that runs script in the site origin on IIS, as the shipped web.config lacks a sandbox CSP.
  • The SVG sanitizer can also be bypassed via a non-ASCII namespace prefix such as <xé:script>, allowing stored SVG cross-site scripting.
  • A category- or language-scoped FAQ editor can rewrite the visibility ACL and tags of any FAQ, and overwrite orphaned FAQs, via a cross-language /admin/api/faq/update request.
  • updateUserRights re-grants a category-restricted group right as a global direct user right, letting a USER_EDIT administrator widen the category scope. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-3666.
  • The public REST API (PUT /api/v4.0/faq/update, POST faq/create, POST category) ignores the 4.2 category- and language-scoped rights, so restricted editors can rewrite published FAQs outside their scope.
  • Stored cross-site scripting in FAQ comments: Utils::parseUrl() strips https:// from sanitized HTML, turning an allowed href="https://javascript:443/..." into a javascript: URL.
  • Incomplete remediation of CVE-2023-5320: the main.referenceURL setting accepts executable JavaScript URLs.
  • Scoped FAQ editors can read private notes outside their category and language scope in phpMyFAQ 4.2.0-RC.1.
  • Passkey enrollment needs only a session and a CSRF token without step-up authentication, silently replaces the owner's passkeys, and survives password change or reset. A hijacked session therefore becomes a persistent login.
  • The admin password-change form (POST /admin/password/update) verifies the current password without lockout, bypassing the step-up throttle (CWE-307).
  • Category editors can modify translations outside their allowed language scope.
  • The WebAuthn endpoint POST /api/webauthn/prepare answers differently for existing and unknown logins and is not rate limited, so anyone can enumerate accounts.
  • Category ACLs are not enforced on category metadata: /category/{id}/{slug}.html shows group-restricted and inactive categories to anyone, and "Restricted users" never hides a category from listings. Restricted and inactive category metadata is also disclosed to unauthenticated users.
  • The admin FAQ editor checks the FAQ_EDIT scope against the route {faqLanguage} but loads the ?lang= UI-language row, so a language-scoped editor can read drafts, private notes, author e-mail addresses, and revisions of other translations.
  • The admin FAQ copy and translate pages check only the global FAQ_ADD and FAQ_TRANSLATE rights, so a scoped or add-only editor can read any FAQ, including drafts, ACL-restricted records, private notes, and author e-mail addresses.
  • In multisite setups an editor on one client instance can delete another instance's attachment files. The blob store is shared and keyed by MD5, but the reference count checks only the local table.
  • A delegated user manager can take over a more privileged non-super-admin account.

Low severity

  • The Web Push "new FAQ" broadcast sends the question and URL of user- and group-restricted FAQs to every push subscriber, bypassing the FAQ ACL.
  • Incomplete fix of GHSA-6648-6g96-mg35: the account-removal ownership check is reflexive, so any logged-in user can still file removal requests as another user.
  • Delegated group and user administrators can wipe all rights of a more-privileged group or administrator via group/permissions and user/update-rights with an empty rights list.
  • A language-scoped FAQ_DELETE administrator can wipe the ACL, tags, votes, comments, and attachments of FAQ translations outside their language scope via DELETE /admin/api/faq/delete.
  • A bookmark side-channel lets any logged-in user read the titles of draft and unpublished FAQs via /user/bookmarks.
  • The admin dashboard "unpublished FAQs" widget and the admin FAQ search ignore the 4.2 category- and language-scoped FAQ_EDIT right, so a scoped editor sees draft titles from every category.

Solution

The phpMyFAQ Team has released the new phpMyFAQ versions 4.1.12 and 4.2.0-RC.2, which fix these vulnerabilities. All users of affected phpMyFAQ versions are encouraged to upgrade as soon as possible to one of these versions.

Workaround

There's no workaround except installing phpMyFAQ 4.1.12 or 4.2.0-RC.2.

Thanks

The phpMyFAQ team would like to thank AlpetGexha, Aka-rang, leediay153, wyx200612, 3rdn4Li, immanuwell, petojanek, and kta1kri for the responsible disclosures of these vulnerabilities.

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